How did the Chiefs botch the first-half ending in Buffalo? Let us count the ways
AI-generated summary reviewed by our newsroom.
- Chiefs chose a field goal on fourth-and-goal from the 1 and lowered win probability.
- Analytics showed the choice cut win probability by several percentage points.
- Clock management and play sequencing telegraphed plays and limited scoring options.
Patrick Mahomes and Josh Allen have traded punches over the last half-decade, landing five each after a Bills 28-21 win in Orchard Park on Sunday.
But there’s something else — something frequently quarterback-related but not quarterback-exclusive — at the center of the last few.
Fourth downs.
It was one year ago that Allen turned a fourth-down scamper into a game-sealing touchdown in Western New York. A few months later in a playoff rematch, the Chiefs defense stopped a fourth-down sneak, which held up as the most influential play in the outcome of an AFC Championship Game.
And on Sunday? The fourth down never happened.
It should have.
Trailing by 11 in the final seconds of the first half, the Chiefs faced fourth-and-goal from the 1, a spot in which Andy Reid should have left the offense on the field for one more try. Instead, on marched the field goal team.
There are several reasons why the Chiefs lost to the Bills, and The Star’s coverage thoroughly examined them in the hours during and immediately after the game.
The chain of events that concluded the first half didn’t top the list.
But it’s on there.
The Chiefs bungled it in more ways than one, more than that fourth-down call, even if the most glaring is the decision to settle for three.
The ESPN analytics model dropped the Chiefs’ chances of winning the game from 35.7% to 30.5% when coach Andy Reid elected to have kicker Harrison Butker close out the first half rather than quarterback Patrick Mahomes — or, say, running back Kareem Hunt. The Next Gen Stats model graded the decision even more harshly, a 7% dip in win probability.
It’s hard to find that kind of edge in a football game, and the Chiefs just deliberately passed on it.
“I wanted points,” Reid said when I asked him about the decision. “We had to come out of there with points.
“I thought about (going for) it, for sure. But I thought getting the field goal was the right thing to do there.”
He’s followed through on that first thought — going for it — more frequently than ever. The Chiefs lead the NFL in fourth-down conversions (16) and rank second in attempts (21).
And if you only look at the first halves of games — before the flow might require a trailing team to go for a first down — it more emphatically proves Reid’s shift in philosophy. He’s gone for it on fourth down 11 times in 9 first halves this season, an average of 1.2 attempts per game.
In the previous seven Mahomes-led years, Reid left the offense on the field in the first half on fourth down just 37 times combined, an average of 0.3 times per game.
It’s a drastic change, and a head coach in his 27th season deserves credit for a willingness to make a drastic change.
From their 11 first-half attempts this season, which include two unsuccessful tries, the Chiefs have generated a total of 17 expected points added (EPA), per the NFLfastR model, and it’s even more if you prefer the Pro Football Reference calculation. The results have been highly beneficial.
Reid should’ve stuck with the process that’s prompted them:
Aggression.
Again, I’m not saying it would have necessarily changed the outcome of a game in Buffalo. I’m saying it could have, and I’m saying a similar decision could change the outcome of a future game.
It is indeed more difficult to absorb the gut-punch of getting stopped on fourth down a few seconds before halftime — you can’t turn around and play field position after whiffing on it. But it remains a sizable edge. And Reid has spent the season taking those edges when he can find them.
He has his own edge on the roster. At the point of the decision in Buffalo, Kareem Hunt had converted 18 of 20 third- or fourth-and-short carries for the season. He represents the best short-yardage play in football, better than the Tush Push, and it’s no longer a small sample size.
Yes, I know Hunt received the football on first down in that same sequence and failed to get it across the goal line. I am not persuaded by the result of one attempt over the evidence of the previous 20.
This has always been about embracing probabilities, not the luxury of following certainties. And the probabilities overwhelmingly suggested the Chiefs ought to go. (They did score on 4th-and-goal later in the game, which I hold in similar relevance.) But there are other aspects of that entire sequence worth examination. In fact, there’s a lot going on there.
What about first down?
As I mentioned, the Chiefs botched the ending in more ways than fourth down.
They reached the 1-yard line when Mahomes found Hollywood Brown wide open for a 40-yard catch. They had only one timeout, but because the offensive line had to run 40 yards down the field after Brown’s catch, it took the Chiefs a full 20 seconds to get lined up for the next play. They could’ve used the timeout immediately and had 40 seconds to run the final four plays, albeit without a timeout.
(Buffalo called timeout just before the Chiefs snapped the ball on first-and-goal, and while the referees blew the whistle to grant it with 22 seconds left on the clock, they allowed the clock to trickle to 20 seconds and never added time back. The Chiefs weren’t the only ones to make a mistake.)
That left the Chiefs with 20 seconds and one timeout. It’s enough time to run four plays, but what type of four plays?
The Chiefs ran the ball right away, handing it to Hunt on first down.
It didn’t work. Neither did the pass plays on second and third downs.
The problem with that ordering — choosing to run on first down — is that it telegraphed what the Chiefs would do on second and third down. Without timeouts, they had no choice but to pass the ball. Which made it easier for the Bills to play defense — they at least knew what type of play was coming. And if you rewatch second and third down, it’s evident they’re playing the pass. Why wouldn’t they?
If the Chiefs had passed on first down and even second down — maybe even play action, and maybe even something from under center — it would have left the Bills guessing on every down of the sequence. Or it at least would have left them with a lot more to consider.
Which, by the way, would have been yet one more benefit of a fourth-down attempt.
Everything would have been in play.
Including, say, the best short-yardage back in the league.