Volkswagen’s test rigging follows a long auto industry pattern

Long before Volkswagen admitted to cheating on emissions tests for millions of cars worldwide, the automobile industry, Volkswagen included, had a well-known record of sidestepping regulation and even duping regulators.

For decades, car companies found ways to rig mileage and emissions testing data. In Europe, some automakers have taped up test cars’ doors and grilles to bolster the aerodynamics. Others have used “superlubricants” to reduce friction in the car’s engine to a degree that would be impossible in real-world driving conditions.

Automakers have even been known to make test vehicles lighter by removing the back seats.

Cheating in the United States started as soon as governments began regulating automotive emissions in the early 1970s. In 1972, certification of Ford’s new cars was held up after the Environmental Protection Agency found that the company had violated rules by performing constant maintenance of its test cars, which lowered emissions but did not reflect driving conditions in the real world. Ford walked away with a $7 million fine.

The next year, the agency fined Volkswagen $120,000 after finding that the company had installed devices intended specifically to shut down a vehicle’s pollution control systems. In 1974, Chrysler had to recall more than 800,000 cars because similar devices were found in the radiators of its cars.

Such gadgets became known as “defeat devices,” and they have long been banned by the EPA. But their use continued to proliferate, and they became more sophisticated, as illustrated by Volkswagen’s admission this week that 11 million diesel cars worldwide were equipped with software used to cheat on emissions tests.

Beyond emissions, the industry has long been contemptuous of regulation. Henry Ford II called air bags “a lot of baloney,” and executives have bristled at rules requiring higher mileage per gallon. Robert A. Lutz, a former General Motors vice chairman and Chrysler president, often said the rules were like “trying to cure obesity by requiring clothing manufacturers to make smaller sizes.”

The universe of automotive scandals has been a broad and often tragic one, including Ford’s 1978 recalls of 1.5 million Pintos after evidence emerged that its gas tanks were prone to catch fire during impacts. Chrysler was indicted in 1987 on charges of disconnecting the odometers of 60,000 cars used by executives and then selling them as new. The Ford-Firestone scandal that started in the late 1990s was linked to 271 deaths. And more than 23 million cars have been recalled by 11 automakers over air bags made by Takata that could violently rupture in a crash.

Misleading gas mileage claims have disturbed regulators and consumers who find cars often use more gas than promised on the window sticker. Last year, Korean automakers Hyundai and Kia paid $300 million in a settlement with the Justice Department and the EPA for overstating the mileage of 1.2 million vehicles. Ford also cut the mileage rating of one of its hybrid electric vehicles in 2013 after complaints, and the EPA has imposed stiffer fines for overstating mileage claims.

No matter the offense, penalties have often been fleeting. Executives are not jailed. Fines are manageable.

In the United States, automakers’ lobbying has ensured that the statute giving powers to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration “has no specific criminal penalty for selling defective or noncompliant vehicles,” said Joan Claybrook, a former administrator of the agency and longtime auto safety advocate.

There are no criminal penalties under laws applying to the EPA for violations of motor vehicle clean air rules, though there is a division of the Justice Department devoted to violations of environmental law.

“I don’t see them changing this behavior unless criminal penalties are enacted into law that allow the prosecutor to put the executives in jail,” Claybrook said.

Software gives automakers a new advantage. Modern cars can sense collisions and start braking before drivers do and are even on the verge of driving themselves. So perhaps it is no surprise they can also sense when they are in a laboratory and, knowing that, put their best foot forward.

The advent of the computerized car and the use of software to dupe regulators have been years in the making. General Motors paid $45 million in 1995 and recalled nearly half a million Cadillacs that were equipped with a chip that shut off emissions control systems while the air conditioner was being used to improve the car’s performance.

In 1998, the EPA announced a settlement of nearly $1 billion against long-haul truck engine manufacturers for violations similar to Volkswagen’s — using software to optimize the performance of diesel engines during laboratory testing.

Some believe that using software to cheat on laboratory results goes beyond Volkswagen.

While officially stated fuel efficiency and carbon dioxide emissions figures have steadily improved over the years, real-world tests showed no corresponding improvement, according to the Brussels-based European Federation for Transport and Environment, an advocacy group. In fact, the group’s testing found that the average diesel car was producing emissions five times as high as what was permitted. There were vehicles from BMW and Opel that emitted 10 times much pollution on the road as in the lab.

The difference between the lab and real-world results swelled to 40 percent last year, on average, from 8 percent in 2002, the group also found.

“We call it the tip of the iceberg,” said Jos Dings, the director of Transport and Environment. “We don’t think this will be limited to Volkswagen. If you look at the testing numbers for the other manufacturers, they are just as bad.”

This story was originally published September 23, 2015 at 3:04 PM with the headline "Volkswagen’s test rigging follows a long auto industry pattern."