Inside how the best Royals team in at least 30 years was built

They met in an office on the fifth floor of Kauffman Stadium. This was a Tuesday in July. Three days remained until baseball’s non-waiver trade deadline but the best Royals team in at least 30 years had just been made even better.

Dayton Moore called this meeting. The men who left their jobs and moved their families over the last decade to work with him listened. This was a long time coming. Not just the nearly 10 years since Moore agreed to be general manager of what was then baseball’s worst franchise. The last year had been leading up to this moment.

The Royals came within one swing of winning the 2014 World Series. They had reconnected a city with the sport, reminding some how intoxicating a good team can be and introducing a new addiction to others. The day after Game 7, thousands showed up for a celebration of a team that came so close. Nearly all of the important pieces would be back the next year, but an hour after the party ended, Moore had gathered his lieutenants in his office to make clear they had to improve.

Getting to the World Series was no longer enough. What a difference from the sad sack organization they inherited.

There were a hundred ways they could have improved for this encore season, but Moore focused mostly on two. The Royals would need a better and deeper lineup, preferably with more versatility. And they would need help in the starting rotation, particularly at the top.

Some of this they could do that winter. But some of it would have to wait until the July trade deadline. The Royals front office believes deeply in the emotional and mental chunks of baseball. Beyond improving the team with what is generally better access to talent at the deadline, they thought making a big trade could improve what they have come to call “the psychology of our team.”

That’s what made this meeting on a Tuesday night this past July so important. The Royals made not just one major move, but two. In the clubhouse, the same players who a year ago wondered whether the front office believed in them were now thrilled with trades for Johnny Cueto and Ben Zobrist in a span of three days.

Those deals, along with the ones made in the offseason, were the result of weeks, months, and in some cases years of evaluations and work. So when they met that night, even with three days until the trade deadline, the vision had been realized. The best Royals team any of them had been involved with had improved as much as any of them figured was possible.

“Guys,” one of the men in that room remembered Moore saying, “you don’t need to stay here until the deadline. If anything comes up, I’ll call you. But go do what you need to do.”

For Moore, that meant going to New York to watch his son play in a tournament. J.J. Picollo, the assistant general manager, met his family on the Outer Banks in North Carolina. Gene Watson, director of professional scouting, went to San Antonio to put together some reports.

Their work in building a team that would finish with the American League’s best record and play in a second consecutive World Series was largely complete. Finally.

They put a lot into this.

Their pursuit of four key starters is particularly informative about how the Royals are back on baseball’s biggest stage with a better team than the one that fell 90 feet short last year.

The Royals wanted power in the middle of the lineup. They hit fewer home runs than any team in baseball last year, and when Billy Butler regressed as far as he did — his 2014 slugging percentage was two points higher than shortstop Alicides Escobar’s — it left the Royals vulnerable.

They made a miscalculation on Butler’s market value. They declined an $11.5 million option on him for 2015, originally thinking they might resign him at a lower annual number. The A’s surprised the Royals and much of baseball by signing Butler to a three-year, $30 million deal, so Moore began to think of an old target.

The Royals had liked Kendrys Morales for years. Moore has long had an affinity for switch hitters. Chipper Jones once told him that switch hitting required exceptional athleticism, indefatigable work ethic, or both. As a more practical matter, it eliminates certain pitches from certain pitchers and gives the manager more options in making out a lineup.

They talked about signing Morales before each of the last two seasons, actually, on the theory that he might be a cheaper alternative if they could flip Butler for prospects. A deal never materialized.

Morales’ context had changed now, though. He skipped spring training and sat out the first two months of 2014 in what was essentially a contract dispute, and had a miserable season at the plate. But the Royals’ scouts saw the same physical tools, blaming his lack of production on disrupted timing and rhythm.

The Royals thought offering a two-year contract was important, so Morales might feel a sense of commitment and stability after switching teams three times the previous two years.

On Dec. 16, relatively early in the industry-wide free agent shopping season, they signed him to a $17 million contract. Their lineup was deeper, and their clubhouse more energetic.

The Royals wanted stability at the top of their rotation. James Shields had pitched more innings than all but one man over the previous two seasons, but he was gone. The Royals’ top two pitchers were Danny Duffy, who had never thrown 150 innings in a season, and Yordano Ventura, who had just one full season in the big leagues.

Like Morales, the Royals had long admired Edinson Volquez. They nearly traded for him in 2012, nearly signed him as a free agent before 2013, and looked into signing him again before 2014.

Last year with the Pirates, Volquez had his best season since 2008 — 192 2/3 innings with a 3.04 ERA. There had been some talk that Volquez was a product of catcher Russell Martin’s pitch framing, the Pirates’ smart defensive shifts, and other benefits that would not follow him through free agency.

Tim Conroy saw something different. He is one of the Royals’ pro scouts, based in Pittsburgh, and had followed Volquez for years. Conroy saw a stronger commitment to the lower part of the strike zone, and more two-seam fastballs to trade strikeouts for groundouts — ending at bats early.

“When that light bulb goes on for a pitcher, they don’t ever want to go back,” Conroy said. “When you’re young, you waste so many pitches. At the end of your career, it’s like, ‘Why didn’t I know then then what I know now? I’d still be pitching.’ You’ve seen that here.”

On Dec. 29, the Royals signed Volquez to a two-year, $20 million contract. Their rotation was improved, and their worries lessened.

As the summer heated up, it became more and more obvious that the Royals’ greatest weakness was their lack of a No. 1 starter. Top of the rotation pitchers are among the game’s most expensive commodities, available to teams like the Royals only through the farm system or deadline trades.

Moore and his assistants expected to be back in the playoffs, and had always planned on improving their team at the deadline. They focused primarily on a few starting pitchers: Cincinnati’s Johnny Cueto, Philadelphia’s Cole Hamels, and Oakland’s Scott Kazmir.

A’s general manager Billy Beane was focused on getting back a young catcher, which made the Royals a bad trade partner. The Phillies wanted a shortstop, and in discussions with the Royals insisted Raul Mondesi Jr. be included in any deal. The Royals considered Mondesi, Bubba Starling, Miguel Almonte and Cheslor Cuthbert untouchable.

The Reds proved to be a much better fit. They wanted young pitching, and the Royals had plenty. It became apparent early on that Brandon Finnegan would be centerpiece of the deal, and the Reds also liked Cody Reed. The Royals initially pushed back when the Reds asked for John Lamb, too, but after a conference call among the top executives decided it was a fair deal.

“If you’re constantly focused on what you’re giving up, you’ll never make a deal,” Moore said.

The deal did not come off without some drama. Before making the trade for Cueto, the Royals asked the Tigers about David Price. They were told he was not available. He was traded to the Blue Jays a few days later, though major deals are rarely done within the same division and Daniel Norris is generally considered a better talent than anyone the Royals sent to Cincinnati.

The Royals had not heard back from the Reds when news of the deal leaked from Cincinnati. A teammate told Cueto he was being traded before his start on July 25. The next day, the Reds told the Royals the deal was on. The Royals announced it on their videoboard during the third inning of their July 26 game against the Astros.

Royals coaches and officials had worried about the energy of their team when nothing happened at last year’s deadline. Now, they knew they sent a very clear message about what was expected.

The simplest deal was the last deal. In the beginning, the Royals wanted Ben Zobrist as a sort of Swiss Army knife, moving around to at least four different positions and eventually settling in at either second base or right field. But when Alex Gordon’s groin gave out on July 8, they intensified the talks.

Club officials worried an already free-swinging lineup would particularly miss Gordon’s ability to get on base and work counts. Scoring in the playoffs means beating good pitching, and beating good pitching means stacking together quality plate appearances. There was a subtle fear among some that Gordon might not come back from the injury, or if he did would not be the same player.

The A’s liked Sean Manaea, a former sandwich pick in the Royals’ system, and were willing to do the deal. The only hang-up was that the Royals’ budget did not have room to take on payroll in any deal, which isn’t rare for mid- or small-market clubs, but does complicate trades.

The A’s are one of baseball’s most budget-conscious franchises, so this was more than fine print. The general structure of Manaea and Zobrist had been in place for a week or more before the deal was finalized, the Royals essentially adding Aaron Brooks to make up for the A’s paying out Zobrist’s contract.

Zobrist made the Royals more versatile both offensively and defensively, and lengthened and added both power and dependability to the lineup. The Royals finalized the trade on July 28. That night, Moore gathered his top assistants for that meeting. Their work was mostly done.

Back in the winter after the 2012 season, Moore made what at that point was the defining trade of his time in Kansas City: James Shields and Wade Davis for Wil Myers and prospects. Over and over, he said that would only be the first of many deals to execute for the Royals to win a championship and maintain success. That was never more apparent than this July.

“Extremely thrilled,” Moore said this week of how he felt at the time.

Moore is different. You hear this over and over from the people who know him well. He is driven to win in a complete way, but talks much more about the journey than the goal.

This has gotten him in trouble before. His references to “the process” became a target for mockery when the losing persisted, and his point two years ago about enjoying the city’s reconnection with baseball nearly as much as a championship was awkwardly worded and became a punchline for many fans: “In a small way, I feel like we won the World Series.”

The team that will try to win the Royals’ first World Series in 30 years represents nearly a full decade of Moore’s time. This is his professional legacy, but if baseball’s biggest stage is changing his emotions he’s doing a good job keeping it from some of the people who know him best.

“He’s pretty stoic,” said Picollo, Moore’s top assistant with the Royals.

“He’s got his life perspective aligned very comfortably for him and around his family,” said John Schuerholz, the Braves president who raised Moore professionally.

“Seems the same to me,” said George Brett, the Hall of Famer who watches many games next to Moore.

Moore watches most games from a suite, except in Toronto, where the Blue Jays put him and other Royals officials in the stands behind the visitors dugout. Moore likes to watch his team in a small group, sometimes only family. Sometimes, if a moment is particularly tense or he just needs new scenery, he’ll find a TV in the clubhouse or a quiet corner.

Maybe it’s a defense mechanism. Maybe it’s the uncomplicated truth from a man with no more decisions to make about a team that may or may not make him a world champion. This is the product of his professional life, by far the best team he’s built in Kansas City, but even now, so close to the end, he’s trying to focus on the process instead of the outcome.

“We want to win a world championship, of course, we’re competitors,” he said. “But that’s momentary. As soon as you win, or the season is over, we’re going to have a press conference and the first thing everybody’s going to ask is, ‘How are you going to replace Cueto or Zobrist?’ Or, ‘What will you do with Alex Gordon?’

“So you enjoy the day. The big picture is this: the Kansas City Royals are as healthy as they’ve ever been, and we’re growing the game, honoring the game, and making sure it’s appreciated by the next baseball fan. That’s what it’s all about.”

This story was originally published October 26, 2015 at 8:28 PM with the headline "Inside how the best Royals team in at least 30 years was built."