25 years ago, Democrats ruled Missouri. Here’s how Republicans flipped the script | Opinion
As another election year unfolds, it is worth remembering how much the political landscape of Missouri has changed since 25 years ago. Then, the Democratic Party controlled the General Assembly and provided one senator and five of the nine representatives to Congress in Washington, D.C. It held the governorship and four of the other five statewide positions. Today, the party is reduced to two U.S. representatives, with no statewide officers and fewer than a third of the General Assembly seats.
How did this transformation come about? Did the Democrats blow a full house, or did the Republicans have aces up their sleeves?
The principal explanation for how the Democrats lost their advantage is that the party deserted the average Missouri voter: It is no longer the party of native son President Harry Truman. In 1999, the party encompassed a broad spectrum of views, including those with quite conservative opinions on social matters such as gun ownership and abortion rights, and covered a wide geography — not just the urban centers, but a swath of rural constituencies especially along the Mississippi and Missouri rivers, where there was an historical aversion to the GOP.
Allegiance to the Democrats was also the consequence of the problem-solving pragmatism of its representatives, who were pillars of their communities. Their dominance came to an end with the imposition of term limits for legislators in the General Assembly. The Republicans exploited the retirement of these long-serving officials, leaving the Democrats increasingly concentrated in Kansas City and St. Louis, with an urban-centric pitch that alienated not just rural Missourians, but also those who had moved to suburbia precisely to escape the higher taxation and greater regulation of the cities. Republican-controlled redistricting further concentrated the Democratic vote, which in turn has led Missouri’s Democratic leadership to embrace a more ideologically centered program to suit urban minority and sectional groups.
There have also been demographic and economic trends working against the Democrats. Missouri does not have the social and racial/ethnic composition of a typical “blue” seat, and there has been no significant inward migration to change that situation. If anything, there has been an emigration of young college-educated people who might have been potential supporters of the party. Especially after the 2008 economic crash, the state lost unionized jobs through globalization and transfer of business to the South, undermining a key source of Democratic support.
These socioeconomic problems provided Republicans with opportunities to raise the political stakes. Exploiting the rise of Fox News, they communicated a powerful, but simple message on gun protection, abortion restriction and lower taxation. This was mirrored by a populist program pursued by the Republican leadership in the General Assembly. The party concentrated on mobilizing the evangelical Christian community, housewives and suburbanites, but it also realized it could convert significant numbers of erstwhile Democrats who were socially conservative and keen to benefit from federal largesse, but against wasteful government spending funded by their taxes. The GOP then improved candidate selection, choosing local conservatives to carry their message into traditionally Democratic-voting communities.
The change in fortunes for the Democrats came more quickly in presidential elections than at state level: The party has not won Missouri since 1998 and it has ceased to be of interest to the Democratic cause. In contrast, say, with Barack Obama’s 2012 campaign which played to the base and lost heavily in Missouri, those Democrats successful in statewide elections — Jay Nixon or Claire McCaskill — focused on the ‘‘meat and potatoes” issues of concern to residents of the state, such as rural hospitals and school funding. But even these smart operators were outbid by the MAGA message that resonated with so many disaffected voters, allowing Republican candidates to win over the white, male working class voters who had remained loyal to the Democratic Party.
The Democrats’ brand has become toxic for a large proportion of Missourians who might back progressive ballot propositions on Medicaid, marijuana or the minimum wage, but are not yet ready to embrace even a President Joe Biden-led party. In a more polarized political environment, the Republicans have successfully promoted political values that blend cultural and economic ingredients, such as a suburban dislike of government interference on personal matters, blue collar workers suffering from growing economic insecurity and career threats, and rural feelings of alienation, neglect and urban condescension. Their approach has been especially potent among so-called “conflicted conservatives”, whose cultural conservatism has trumped their economic liberalism.
The 21st century dealt the GOP a good hand, which it has played well. By contrast, the Democrats certainly had no high-value cards, and failed to exploit the deck they had.
Peter Reilly is a retired consultant in London, England. He is the author of the master’s degree thesis “Why Missouri Swung Right” from the University of Edinburgh.