People died in Table Rock duck boat tragedy because we didn’t learn from history

Seventeen people died on July 19, 2018, when the Stretch Duck 7 boat sank on Table Rock Lake near Branson, Missouri. This accident was both predictable and preventable. It was predictable in that duck boats’ design shortcomings were well known, as were the probability and effects of severe weather that day. It was preventable too, in that had proper actions been taken by the United States Coast Guard and the vessel’s operator, Ride the Ducks, the deaths would not have occurred.

These World War II amphibious assault craft were never intended to serve as commercial tour boats. A significant duck boat design flaw is the vessels’ lack of reserve buoyancy, the ability to stay afloat even when full of water. This particular boat’s side curtains and overhead canopies, which had been added for passenger comfort, impeded the ability of people to escape as the boat went under. The same thing occurred in the 1999 sinking of the Miss Majestic in Lake Hamilton, near Hot Springs, Arkansas — an accident that claimed 13 lives.

Between 1999 and 2015, the National Transportation Safety Board investigated five duck boat accidents and issued 22 safety recommendations. Only nine of those 22 recommendations were acted upon favorably. Following the Table Rock sinking, we again reminded the Coast Guard about the critical need to add reserve buoyancy to all duck boats, as well as the need to remove canopies and curtains from any vessels that have not yet received this modification. The NTSB is pleased to see the Coast Guard has issued a Marine Safety Information Bulletin recommending the removal of canopies and curtains as a first step.

Missouri is no stranger to extreme weather, nor should this storm have been a surprise. The National Weather Service tracked the severe storm across multiple states for several hours prior to the sinking. The Weather Service issued a severe thunderstorm warning at least 20 minutes before the boat entered the water. This weather event was well announced and should have surprised no one. Available weather data showed the storms moving at about 50 miles per hour with surface winds potentially in excess of 60 mph, far exceeding the 35 mph maximum winds for operating duck boats.

Despite all this information, neither the Stretch Duck 7’s captain nor Ride the Ducks’ operations manager took action to halt operations. A boat’s captain has the final say on the safety of the vessel and should be able to recognize adverse weather. But surprisingly, the subject is lightly tested on the Coast Guard’s captain exam. We have asked the Coast Guard to review the training and certification requirements for licensed mariners regarding hazardous weather. There is opportunity for improvement.

Our investigators were unable to interview the captain and key operations personnel to get a better understanding of their actions because of a concurrent and ongoing criminal investigation. Safety investigations have different goals from those of the justice system. That’s a discussion for another day, but I believe there’s an opportunity here to set better practices that will allow a safety investigation to get all the information needed to prevent future accidents.

We had the knowledge to prevent this tragedy. Unfortunately, the Table Rock disaster proves the adage that those who do not learn from the past are condemned to repeat it. The full NTSB report is available on our website at ntsb.gov.

This story was originally published May 17, 2020 at 5:00 AM with the headline "People died in Table Rock duck boat tragedy because we didn’t learn from history."